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ISRAEL, TURKEY, AND THE GAZA BLOCKADE
DANIEL BENOLIEL*
This Article provides a critical assessment of the crisis between Israel
and Turkey, the two most prominent military powers in the Eastern
Mediterranean region. It concerns the Israeli blockade over the Gaza
Strip.
This Article critically analyzes the Turkish-led position that has been
adopted by governments worldwide, including Arab governments, human
rights NGOs, and several organs of the United Nations, in their joint
critique of the Israeli blockade or siege policy towards Gaza. This topic is
especially pertinent given the backdrop of Israel’s recent litigious
enforcement of its naval blockade in international waters.
The Article separately evaluates both countries’ behaviors in these
recent events. It also admits the need to discretely assess Israel’s blockade
policy over Gaza at land, air, and sea. The Article cautions against
Turkey’s rather weak legal reasoning in framing Israel’s legal regime, ab
initio, as belligerent occupation law, absent armed conflict towards
Hamas-led Gaza, thereby missing the opportunity to assess Israel’s
adherence to the laws of armed conflicts more accurately.
This Article unveils Turkey’s oblique denial of Israel’s lawful right to
self defense by failing to correctly analyze Israel’s application of the laws
of armed conflicts towards Hamas.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Deterioration in Israeli–Turkish relations, two primary regional
powers, has recently accelerated at an alarming rate.1 This became
most noticeable during Israel’s attack on the humanitarian flotilla
headed towards Gaza on May 31, 2010. Organized by the Free
Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights
and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief, the flotilla carried
humanitarian aid and construction materials with the intention of
breaking the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The Gaza raid shook
already unstable Middle Eastern geo-politics. Since March of 1949,
when Israeli–Turkish relations were formalized,2 Turkey became
the first Muslim majority country (before Iran in 1950),3 to
recognize the State of Israel.4 Since then, Turkey and Israel, which

See Turkey Condemns Israel Over Deadly Attack on Gaza Aid Flotilla, THE
TELEGRAPH, May 31, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news
/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/7789077/Turkey-condemnsIsrael-over-deadly-attack-on-Gaza-aid-flotilla.html (discussing the warning by the
Turkish Foreign Ministry that Israeli actions have caused irreparable
consequences in bilateral relations).
2 See JACOB ABADI, ISRAEL’S QUEST FOR RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE IN ASIA 6
(2004) (noting that Turkey granted official recognition to the newly established
Jewish State in 1949).
3 Id. at 37.
4 See Akram T. Hawas, The New Alliance: Turkey and Israel—Is It a Course
Towards New Division of the Middle East?, at The Fourth Nordic Conference on
Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in Globalizing World (Oslo, August 13–
16, 1998), available at http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/hawas.html (stating that
“Turkey and Israel represent two different historical courses . . . the alliance
between Turkey and Israel can easily be changed to enmity, thus making room for
new constellations and a new regional balance/imbalance.”); see also The
1
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both share concerns regarding regional instabilities in the Middle
East, have accorded high priority to military, strategic, and
diplomatic cooperation. Ties have become strained since the 2008–
2009 Israel-Gaza Conflict and the raid on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla
international naval convoy to Gaza, during which, nine Turkish
activists were killed by Israeli troops and seven Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) soldiers were injured.5
Widespread international reactions followed. These reactions
included condemnation from governments, international
organizations, human rights NGOs and individuals worldwide.6
The United Nations Security Council condemned “those acts
resulting in civilian deaths,” and demanded an impartial
investigation of the raid from both Turkey and Israel.7 It further
called for the immediate release of civilians held by Israel.8 The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Timeline of Turkish-Israeli Relations,
1949–2006 (2006), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/documents
/44edf1a5d337f.pdf (noting that Turkey recognized the state of Israel in 1949).
5 See Ian Black & Haroon Siddique, Q&A: The Gaza Freedom Flotilla, THE
GUARDIAN, May 31, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/31/qa-gaza-freedom-flotilla (showing the unlikeliness that recent talks will improve
current Israeli-Turkish relations after the raid). The Gaza Flotilla raid was a
military operation against a convoy of six ships carrying 663 people, including
pro-Palestinian activists, journalists, and humanitarians, from 37 nations. See
Noah Kosharek, Liel Kyzer & Barak Ravid, Israel Transfers Hundreds of Gaza Flotilla
Activists
to
Airport
for
Deportation,
HAARETZ,
Jan.
6,
2010,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-to-deport-allactivists-seized-on-gaza-flotilla-1.293634 (finding that Israel had begun deporting
foreign activists from Israel after the Flotilla raid).
6 See Israel-OPT: Flotilla Aid to Enter Gaza under UN Supervision, IRIN, June 17
2010,
available
at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89525
(explaining that the UN is taking responsibility in overseeing the delivery of
humanitarian aid that Israel seized during the Gaza raid); UN Says Aid to Gaza
Should
Be
Delivered
by
Land,
AFP,
(July
23,
2010),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAdN25_kLyw4mSJ_
57umHQj-LZwQ (discussing the possibility of delivering aid to Gaza by land
through specific routes to avoid further conflict with Israel).
7 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Acts
Resulting in Civilian Deaths During Israeli Operation Against Gaza-Bound Aid
Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in Presidential Statement, U.N. Press Release
SC/9940 (May 31, 2010) (pressing for full consular access to ensure that proper
humanitarian assistance can reach its destination).
8 Riots Break Out Over Israel Flotilla, CBS NEWS (May 31 2010), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6535491n; see also Videos Timeline of
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Turkish reaction to the raid and deaths involved much
inflammatory rhetoric.9 Turkish president Abdullah Gül stated
that it was the first time since World War I that Turkey had been
attacked.10 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan added
that “[i]n the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, the heart of
humanity has taken one of her heaviest wounds in history.”11
Turkey recalled its ambassador from Israel and demanded that
Israel acknowledge its responsibility for the attack and convey a
public apology to the Republic of Turkey, backed by adequate
compensation for damages resulting from Israel’s “unlawful
attack.”12
In February 2011, Turkey made its investigation of the flotilla
attack public, and the United Nations Secretary-General received
both the Turkish and Israeli reports.13 The decision to investigate

Flotilla Incident as Presented by Eiland Team of Experts, 13 July 2010, ISRAEL DEFENSE
FORCES (July 15, 2010), http://idfspokesperson.com/2010/07/15/videos-timelineof-flotilla-incident-as-presented-by-eiland-team-of-experts-english-version-13july-2010/ (presenting videos of the Gaza flotilla incident through the narration of
the Eiland team of experts).
9 See Sharon Roffe-Ofir, Riots in Umm al-Fahm Over Naval Raid on Gaza Aid
Flotilla, YNET NEWS (May 31, 2010), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3896946,00.html (describing demonstrations by Arab-Israeli residents of Umm alFahm against the Gaza raid).
10 See supra note 7.
11 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech on Israeli Attack
on Aid Flotilla (June 2, 2010), available at http://palestinechronicle.com
/view_article_details.php?id=16018 [hereinafter Turkish Prime Minister’s
Speech].
12 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON
THE HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY TO GAZA ON 31 MAY 2010, at 1, 8 (Feb. 12, 2011),
available
at
http://gazaflotilla.delegitimize.com/statements/internationalstatements/official-turkish-report-israeli-attack-on-the-humanitarian-aid-convoyto-gaza/ [hereinafter TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY] (noting that Israel
launched a full-fledged attack using excessive force and disregarding any civilian
status); Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Address at the
United
Nations
Security
Council
(May
31,
2010),
available
at
http://www.un.int/turkey/page403.html [hereinafter Security Council Speech]
(noting that the Gaza flotilla attack was a crime against the United Nations).
13 See THE TURKEL COMM’N, THE PUB. COMM’N TO EXAMINE THE MAR. INCIDENT
OF
31 MAY 2010, PART I, 53 (2011), available at http://turkelcommittee.gov.il/files/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf [hereinafter THE ISRAELI
TURKEL COMM.] (examining the security circumstances surrounding the Gaza raid,
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the event was in accordance with an earlier Presidential Statement
issued by the United Nations Security Council in June 2010 which
called for a prompt, impartial, credible, and transparent
investigation conforming to international standards.14 The Turkish
official opinio juris sive necessitatis (opinion of law or necessity) was
cited in two political speeches made by Turkey’s Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu, who spoke at an emergency meeting of the
United Nations Security Council,15 and by Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a speech to the Turkish
Parliament.16
The Turkish-led position based its view on three main
arguments. The first two—which are the focal point of this
Article—question Israel’s legal regime as one of armed conflict
(possibly international) absent belligerent occupation. In startling
contrast to the Israeli Supreme Court decision in Al-Bassiouni v.
Prime Minister, supported by the Israeli Turkel Commission
Report, the Turkish government, and the UNHRC Fact Finding
Report centered their legal analysis on the applicability of
belligerent occupation law in Gaza.17 Additional analysis was

whether Israel’s actions complied with International law, and the actions carried
out by the organizers and participants of the flotilla).
14 See Israel/Palestine: Gaza, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6524793/k.EFFC
/February_2011brIsraelPalestine_Gaza.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (discussing
the Panel of Inquiry and possible expected council action to follow the inquiry).
15 See Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (addressing the civilian deaths
associated with the Gaza raid by Israeli Defense Forces).
16 Erdogan, supra note 11.
17 See Human Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-Finding
Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting From the Israeli Attacks on the
Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, ¶¶ 62–6, A/HRC/15/21
(Sept. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Report] (noting that despite
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Israel has remained an occupying power
in Gaza, and that occupation does not preclude the application of the
International Covenant Civil and Political Rights); see also Human Rights Council,
Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 278, A/HRC/12/48
(Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter The Goldstone Report] (discussing the events of the
Gaza raid and stating that Israel is still the occupying power in Gaza).
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provided by human rights organizations18 and the United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (a.k.a. the Goldstone
Report) which were submitted earlier in 2009.19 Regrettably,
almost no analytical attention was given to the applicability of
armed conflicts law as particular law,20 or as an alternative to
belligerent occupation law.21 The third argument put by Turkey
and others is that the enforcement of the naval blockade in
international waters by Israel is unlawful. Since Israel’s naval
blockade on the Gaza Strip is unlawful, it would follow that any
act Israel performs as a function of this blockade is also inherently
unlawful.22 The Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid convoy in
international waters thus constituted a violation of the freedom of
navigation and the safety of navigation on the high seas.23 The
importance of this matter and its numerous implications require
further investigation on its merits and regarding the matter’s
inherent legal model or regime.

18 See, e.g., THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 51 (discussing the
testimony of Jessica Montel, a member of the Israeli Human Rights Organization
B’Tselem).
19 See generally The Goldstone Report, supra note 17.
20 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 33–34 (2009) (explaining that the law of belligerent occupation is
inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts, which are often called civil
wars); Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 272 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2009) (noting that “[t]he
law of belligerent occupation applies in international armed conflict only”);
Richard R. Baxter, Ius in Bello Interno: The Present and Future Law, in LAW AND CIVIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 531 (John N. Moore ed., 1974) (noting that no attempt
has been made to determine which articles of the four Geneva Convention of 1949
could work in internal conflicts); Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project: Qualification
of Armed Conflicts, GENEVA ACADEMY OF HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed
_conflict.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (“International humanitarian law refers to
two different types of armed conflict: international armed conflicts and conflicts of
a non-international character.”); see infra Part 2 (discussing the framework for the
law of armed conflict).
21 See infra Part 3 (discussing the law of belligerent occupation).
22 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that any
action stemming from Israel’s unlawful occupation act will also be unlawful);
Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (same); Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech,
supra note 11 (same).
23 Id.
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In consideration of the proper legal regime, Part 2 considers the
first underlying proposition, specifically, whether international
armed conflict (but possibly non-international armed conflict)
between Israel and Hamas is per se unlawful or part of the
As argued in the
belligerent occupation over Gaza.24
abovementioned Turkish Report, Israel’s failure to continue its
armed conflict with Hamas as one of international character
precludes it from establishing a lawful naval blockade of the Gaza
Strip.25 The Article offers, in reply, numerous reservations, both
methodological and substantive, against the Turkish proposition.
It explains why, especially post 9/11, the Turkish stand seems to be
losing much explanatory power within customary international
law and state practice and in light of tensions between Israel and
Hamas. The Turkish viewpoint bears witness to a rather troubling
analytical sway by critiques of Israel’s claims that it is defending
itself against Palestinian non-state actors. Flat adherence to the law
of belligerent occupation, absent non-international armed conflict,
fails to account for Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas’s
deliberate attacks on civilian population since the 2005
disengagement from Gaza.26
Part 3 analyzes a second underlying Turkish-led proposition
that even since Israel’s 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip,27 a
24 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 78; Security
Council Speech, supra note 12. The application of international rather than noninternational armed conflict in this case remains debatable. Whether IHL applies
in either case is outside the scope of this Article.
25 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 7 (explaining that any
act that Israel performs as a function of the blockade is unlawful); Security
Council Speech, supra note 12 (discussing how Gaza was unlawfully ambushed);
Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11 (arguing that the ambush was an
attack against international law).
26 See, e.g., David Kretzmer, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment
of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88 (2005) (arguing for an
equivalent methodological critique of the ICJ 2004 Advisory Opinion concerning
the military necessity and defense concerns Israel presented in justifying the
Separation Wall); Christian J. Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law
of Self-Defense in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 971 (2005) (arguing that the
ICJ opinion against the legality of the Separation Wall failed to consider Israel’s
particular problem of self-defense against non-state actors).
27 In February 2005, the Israeli government implemented a unilateral
“disengagement plan,” whereby all Israeli settlements and military bases in the
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state of belligerent Israeli occupation over the Gaza Strip still
continues to take place,28 notwithstanding Gaza’s election of
Hamas over Fatah.29 It is widely recognized by the international
community and the United Nations that Israel continues to retain
effective control over the Gaza Strip and as the occupying power
there.30 As a result, Israel cannot lawfully impose a military
blockade on the Gaza Strip.31 As such, any actions based on this
The Article further presents
blockade become unlawful.32
numerous reservations towards this incomplete legal reasoning.
Part 4 critically analyzes a final argument put forth by Turkey
that the law of belligerent occupation implies an absence of noninternational armed conflict. It states that an alleged violation of
Gaza Strip would be dismantled, and all Israeli troops and settlers withdrawn.
See ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL’S DISENGAGEMENT PLAN: 2005
(2005),
available
at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel
/Israel+in+Maps/Israels+Disengagement+Plan-+2005.htm (describing Israel’s
disengagement from the Gaza strip as a demonstration of Israel’s willingness to
make sacrifices in pursuit of peace). See also Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets
Complex Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate, 41 ISR. L. REV. 68, 70 (2008)
[hereinafter Shany, Binary Law] (illustrating four fundamental tensions that
hamper the law of occupation’s application in factually complicated situations);
see also Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza After Israel’s
Disengagement, 8 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 369, 369 (2005) (analyzing the
conflicting positions on the legal status of Gaza and identifying the relevant legal
conditions governing the beginning and end of occupation).
28 See supra note 25 & accompanying text; see also infra Part 3.
29 The result was two governments: a Hamas government in Gaza, and a
Fatah government under the Abbas presidency in the West Bank. See Eli Lake,
Hamas Takes Over Gaza Security Services, N.Y. SUN, June 15, 2007, available at
http://www.nysun.com/article/56622 (discussing Hamas’s takeover of CIAtrained Gaza Security Services); Sherifa Zuhur, U.S. ARMY WAR C., Hamas and
Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics 38 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/zuhur.pdf (considering the changing fortune of
the Palestinian movement and recent outcomes of Israeli strategies aimed at this
group and Palestinian nationalism).
30 See Lake, supra note 29.
31 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 8 (arguing that
Israel’s blockade of Gaza is illegal by definition because Israel is recognized as the
occupying power of Gaza by the United Nations and the international
community); see also Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (urging the Security
Council of the United Nations to condemn Israel’s blockade of Gaza); Turkish
Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11 (calling on the international community to
condemn the Israeli blockade of Gaza).
32 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12.
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human rights by Israel, as part of its blockade policy in Gaza,
further solidifies the conclusion that Israel is belligerently
occupying Gaza.33
2.

THE ABSENCE OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS

2.1. The Positive Framework
A first critique to the Turkish-led stand considers the law of
armed conflicts’ applicability in the Israel-Hamas conflict since the
2005 disengagement. At the outset, Turkey34 and the UNHRC Fact
Finding Report35 classify Gaza as an Israeli occupied territory,
subject to the law enforcement model. The Report could then be
said to authorize the use of force to restore and maintain law and
order.36 The choice in actual fact ignores the particular or parallel
role of the law of armed conflicts. This same stance has been
largely adopted by leading international organizations, which all
seem to follow the Turkish position. The chief organizations that
adopt this stance are the United Nations,37 the International
Commission of the Red Cross,38 Human Rights Watch,39 Amnesty

See, e.g., Security Council Speech, supra note 12.
See supra note 25 & accompanying text.
35 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 15. The UNHRC
Report consistently follows the findings of The Goldstone Report, supra note 17, ¶
278.
36 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention (IV) respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws
and
Customs
of
War
on
Land,
(October
1907),
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195 (describing an occupying nation’s right to
use power to ensure public order and safety). Alternatively, a self-defense claim
may be deemed impermissible if the occupation in itself is considered equivalent
to aggression in the backdrop of legitimate resistance.
37 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/16/72 (Jan. 10, 2010) (by
Richard
Falk),
available
at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/498/94/PDF/N1049894.pdf?OpenElement
(addressing Israel’s compliance with its obligations under international law as an
occupying power in the Palestinian Territories since 1967).
38
International Committee of the Red Cross, The Occupied Palestinian
Territories:
Dignity
Denied
(Dec.
13,
2007),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/palestine-report-131207
(last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (reporting on the hardships Palestinians face because
33
34

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

05 BENOLIEL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

624

11/30/2011 9:31 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

International,40
and
prominent
Israeli
human
rights
organizations.41 A second, rather circumstantial approach holds
that at least some Israeli military operations in Gaza should be
viewed as an armed conflict based on the particular scale and
intensity.42
This modeling of the Israeli-Hamas conflict reverts to law
enforcement standards, not the laws on the use of force or, in
particular, armed conflict.
Those laws are based on the
humanitarian Regulations annexed to The Hague Convention IV of
1907, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and relevant provisions
of customary law, including those codified in Additional Protocol I
to the four Geneva Conventions in the occupied Gaza Strip.

they are prevented from attaining basic necessities and conducting basic daily
activities).
39 See Human Rights Watch, “I Lost Everything” Israel’s Unlawful Destruction of
Property During Operation Cast Lead at 117 (May 13, 2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/13/i-lost-everything (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011) (detailing Israel’s destruction of property by geographic region
during Operation Cast Lead and Israel’s international legal obligations under the
Laws of Occupation); Human Rights Watch, Israel: ‘Disengagement’ Will Not End
Gaza Occupation (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs
/2004/10/29/isrlpa9577.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (arguing that Israel’s plans
to remove its troops and settlements from the Gaza Strip will not end the
occupation of the territory because Israel will retain control over Gaza’s borders,
coastline and airspace, launch incursions at will, and wield overwhelming power
over Gaza’s economy and access to trade).
40 Amnesty International, Document—Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories:
The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations, and Accountability,
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/007/2009/en
/4c407b40-e64c-11dd-9917-ed717fa5078d/mde150072009en.html#1 (detailing the
rules governing hostilities, international human rights law, international criminal
law, among others, between Israel and the Occupies Territories).
41 See, e.g., Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Disengaged
Occupiers:
The
Legal
Status
of
Gaza
(Jan.
2007),
available
at
http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/Report%20for%20the%20website.pdf
(analyzing the legal status of Gaza in relation to Israel’s claim that it owes no
obligations to the residents of Gaza post-disengagement); B’Tselem, The Gaza
Strip—Israel’s
Obligations
Under
International
Law,
available
at
http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/israels_obligations
(detailing
Israel’s
obligation to residents of the Gaza Strip based on international conventions,
international humanitarian law, and international human rights law).
42 See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 40, at 7.
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To begin with, in line with the jus ad bellum theme of this
Article, the International Court of Justice’s 2004 Advisory Opinion
on the Legal Consequences of the Wall, supports the law enforcement
model.43 The court ruled that the right to self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter applies solely against
foreign states and in conflicts that take place in occupied
territories.44
Furthermore, per the jus in bello (justice in war) use of force
analysis, this reasoning is problematic. In contrast to the Turkish
position, the Israeli Turkel Report, the Israeli Supreme Court
decision in Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister, and Israel’s position
presented during Court proceedings, all show that Israel is subject
to the rules of customary international law that apply in armed
conflicts.45
In support of the latter position, critique to the Turkish-led
alternative relates to the following. Even if one acknowledges that
a state of belligerent occupation continues to exist in Gaza since the
2005 disengagement, a well-accepted observation provides that the
law of belligerent occupation is particular in customary law to
international armed conflict and thus offers no inconsistency.46
Notwithstanding the broad customary legal validity of the said
observation, the Israeli Turkel Committee,47 as well as the Israeli
Supreme Court have upheld this position since the 2005
43 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 139 (July 9) [hereinafter ICJ
Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall]
(finding that the construction of a wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories is contrary to international law and stating the legal consequences
arising from that illegality).
44 The International Court of Justice added that as the threat to Israel
originated within the occupied territory Israel could not invoke its right of selfdefense under Article 51 to the U.N. Charter. Id. at 194.
45 See THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 50, section 45, referring to
HCJ 9132/07 Gaber Al-Bassiouni v. The Prime Minister [Jan. 30, 2008]
(unpublished). See the Israeli Supreme Court website for an official English
translation
at:
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/07/320/091/n25
/07091320.n25.pdf. [‘The Al-Bassiouni case’], para. 14.
46 See supra note 20 (discussing the law of belligerent occupation).
47 See THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM, supra note 13, at 53 (“Therefore, in alignment
with the Supreme Court of Israel, the Commission takes the position that Israel’s
effective control of the Gaza Strip ended when the disengagement was completed
in 2005.”).
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disengagement.48 As a result, in addition to the provisions
protecting persons in occupied territories found in the 1907 Hague
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the rules on the
methods and means of warfare will be applicable. The law of
armed conflicts, alongside the self-defense doctrine, hence governs
the use of force relating to the conduct of hostilities in the
backdrop of belligerent occupation, and is subject to the criteria
and thresholds of armed conflicts law.49
But on what critical grounds does this approach trump the
Turkish-led reading of the Israel-Hamas hostilities in the backdrop
of the Gaza Blockade?
2.2. In Self-Defense against Non-State Actors
The first critique responds to an argument set initially by the
UNHRC Report stating that Israel has failed to claim the right of
belligerent interdiction or the wider claim of self-defense. In
separation from the international humanitarian law critique herein,
it is disturbing to witness Turkey’s lack of admittance of Israel’s
underlying right to use force against Hamas, while preliminarily
negating the former’s right to self-defense per se.50 Turkey has

48 See, e.g., The Al-Bassiouni case, supra note 45, para. 12 (“We should point
out in this context that since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control
over what happens in the Gaza Strip. Military rule that applied in the past in this
territory came to an end by a decision of the government . . . .“); HCJ 769/02 Pub.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, para. 16 [unpublished, Dec. 11,
2005] [hereinafter Targeted Killing case], http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng
/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (“The general, principled starting point is
that between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active in Judea,
Samaria, and the Gaza Strip . . . a continuous situation of armed conflict has
existed since the first intifada.”).
49 See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 28 (2004) (exploring the
interface between using human rights law and international humanitarian law to
assess the use of force during armed conflict); see also Brian D. Tittemore,
Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61, 65 (1997) (“The existence of an
armed conflict is a precondition to the application of international humanitarian
law; and the nature of the armed conflict determines the legal regime that will
govern.”).
50 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 14 (“Given the
evidence at the Turkel Committee, it is clear that there was no reasonable
suspicion that the Flotilla posed any military risk of itself. As a result, no case
could be made for intercepting the vessels in the exercise of belligerent rights or
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argued twofold. Firstly, it has argued against Israel’s right to selfdefense and has done so rather vaguely. It has stated this without
clarifying whether its claims refer in particular to the siege policy
over Gaza, the naval blockade per se, the hostilities on board
Flotilla ships on the high seas, the capturing, interrogating, and
arresting procedures of participants of the Flotilla—or any
combination of matters thereof.51 Nevertheless, the broad Turkish
argument could remain relevant for these separate contexts.
Secondly, Turkey has criticized the international community,
which “has been a witness to this humanitarian tragedy for years” and
has supposedly failed to act against Israel.52 Both of these Turkish
arguments are refutable as follows.
In practice, much explanatory power for the critique of the
Turkish position derives from the fact that the self-defense doctrine
towards non-state actors has been drastically altered and amended
since 9/11 and currently may implicate the use of force doctrine
altogether.53 In theory, as will be further explained, following the
determination that a situation of armed conflict exists given
Hamas-Israel hostilities, it would no longer be relevant to justify
Article 51 self-defence.”). For Turkey’s position, see Security Council Speech,
supra note 12, and Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11.
51 See Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (stating broadly that the “use of
force is not an option unless clearly stated in law” and that “[t]he doctrine of selfdefense does not in any way justify the actions taken by the Israeli forces”); see also
Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11 (“At the same time on the ships
were no other passengers than civilians and aid volunteers. The ships were flying
white flags. Despite all those conditions the ships were subject to an armed
attack.”).
52 Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
53 For commentary in support, see Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENSE, 204–08 (2005); Sean D. Murphy, Self Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory
Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 67–70 (2005) (“The most
dramatic example of invoking Article 51 in response to an attack by a nonstate
actor followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The next day, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1368 . . . .”); Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force
Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 533–34
(2002) (focusing on issues involving executive war powers and asking if the
President of the United States needs authority from Congress “to engage in
preemptive strikes against other states”); Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments,
Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 840 (2001) (asking if
the United States’ use of military force against the Taliban and Al-Qeada in
Afghanistan is lawful under the U.N. Charter). For a pre-9/11 view, see Oscar
Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 309, 311(1989) (discussing whether, as a matter of international law, terrorist
bases may be attacked in another country).
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the jus in Bello analysis based on the jus ad Bellum use of force
doctrine.54 Yet despite the focus of this Article on jus in Bello, it
nonetheless bears mention that to the extent that jus ad Bellum
would be relevant, Israel should be permitted to exercise its
inherent right of self-defense against Hamas hostilities. This
proposition is based on several arguments in critique of the
Turkish-led position to the contrary.
For a start, international recognition of the right to self-defense
in continuation has been generated post-9/11 as state practice in
numerous occasions. Notably, this right was invoked by Security
Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), in favor of the
‘War on Terror’ against Al Qaeda, the United States’ invocation of
Article 51 to the United Nations Charter in order to justify the
bombing of Al Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan,55 and the
Russian extraterritorial forceful response to Islamist terror
networks.56 These responses could logically also apply to the
Israeli-Hamas conflict. It should be further noted that such state
practice has been echoed in support of Israel’s right to self -defense
against Hamas, and was declared by: the United States Secretary
General, the current United States Secretary of State,57 leading
European countries including Italy, Germany, and the Czech
54 See Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me—“In Defense of the
International Court,” 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 83 (2005) (“Palestine saw the Israeli claim
to self-defense as involving an illegitimate elision of legal categories, ‘an
impermissible confusion’ between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, which must
be kept separate . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
55 See generally Jules Lobel, Colloquy, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist
Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537 (1999)
(analyzing the method by which the international community measures states’
assertions of facts as a way to justify their use of force in response to a terrorist
attack).
56 For additional discussion, see Tams, supra note 26, at 972 (“States that have
exercised or asserted a right to exercise self-defence against armed attacks by nonstate actors (even if their conduct could not be attributed to another state under
the Nicaragua or Tadic tests) include Iran, Russia, and the United States, while
Israel maintained its position.”) (citations omitted). See generally Antonio Cassese,
Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12
EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 995–96 (2001) (discussing “the impact of the 11 September
tragedy on the law of self-defence” and noting that the “UN Security Council
unanimously passed a resolution on the terrorist strikes (Res. 1368)”).
57 See Clinton Says Israel has Right to Defend Itself, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2009,
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE50Q4QE20090127
(discussing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s support of Israel’s right to selfdefense).
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Republic (currently chairing the Presidency of the European
Union), the current European Union President,58 and numerous
United Nations high ranked officials.59
Secondly, the International Court of Justice Judge Kooijmans
explicitly stated that the hostile attacks on Israel by Palestinians
were unintentional.60 In other words, as violence originated in
Israel’s occupied territories, the ensuing conflict was said to be
unintentional whereby no justification presumably remained for
Israel to defend itself within the scope of Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. Yet, in our recent case, Hamas clearly acted
intentionally in its outward violation of international humanitarian
law, thereby further weakening the relevancy of the International
Court’s Advisory Opinion. Unlike the International Court’s
position over the Separation Wall, Judge Richard Goldstone, the
former Chair of the UNHRC Fact Finding Goldstone Report, has
already categorically reaffirmed the intentionality found in the
actions by Hamas towards Israeli civilians.61 Earlier on, Professor
58 Tamas Berzi, European Reactions to Israel’s Gaza Operation, TAKEAPEN.ORG
(Jan.
29,
2009),
available
at
http://www.takeapen.org/Takeapen
/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=84&FID=1681
(“[T]he
Presidency of the Council of the European Union condemned both the Israeli air
raids and the Palestinian rocket strikes on Israel from Gaza and called for an
immediate end to these activities.”). But see, e.g., Human Rights Council
Continues to Discuss Crisis Situation in Gaza, U.N. Press Release (Jan. 9, 2009)
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/8E8BAE03D7CDF9E8C1
257539006C5F6B (statements of Bolivia and the Arab League with regard to
human rights violations in Gaza).
59 See Gaza: UN Official Asks Israel to Use Restraint in Responding to Rocket
Attacks, UN NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
37143&Cr=palestin&Cr1= (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (quoting Robert Serry, a
U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, as saying “Israel has
a right to self-defence consistent with international humanitarian law”); Douglas
Hamilton, U.N. Condemns Gaza Militants Over Rocket Attacks, REUTERS, Dec. 22,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/22/us-israel-gaza-unidUSTRE6BL37Y20101222 (detailing rocket and mortar firings in Gaza).
60 See David Kretzmer, supra note 26, at 96 n.62 (citing Judge Kooijmans’s
opinion that “when violence originates in occupied territory, the ensuing conflict”
is “noninternational”); ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, at 152–53, paras. 35–36 (considering how
to address the issue of the legality of Israel’s construction of a barrier wall to
prevent attacks).
61 See Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War
Crimes, WASH. POST, Apr. 1 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01
/AFg111JC_print.html (“That the crimes allegedly committed by Hamas were
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Irwin Cotler—a former Canadian Minister of Justice, as along with
Human Rights Watch,62 and Amnesty International63—affirmed
that between the years 2000 through 2008 there was “almost no
comparable example” anywhere in today’s world of a group such as
Hamas that “so systematically [and deliberately] violates
international” law related to armed conflicts.64 Hamas leaders
themselves publically declare the affectivity of their deliberate
hostile activities towards Israeli civilians.65 No relevancy remains,
therefore, to the International Court Advisory Opinion reservation
as to the intentionality, and lack thereof, in applying humanitarian
law provisions or self-defense in the present case.
Thirdly, still on the jurisprudence of self-defense, the
International Court of Justice and the United Nations Human
Rights Committee have in fact admitted, elsewhere, Israel’s right to
self-defense. To begin with, the Court reads Article 51 to require
an armed attack that ‘originates . . . outside [the] territory’ of the state
claiming to act in self-defense. Hostile attacks on Israel from the
partially controlled-West Bank were not sufficiently ‘external’ to

intentional goes without saying—its rockets were purposefully and
indiscriminately aimed at civilian targets.”). Judge Goldstone further clarifies that
in contradiction to policy by Hamas, Israel’s policy indicates that: “[w]hile the
investigations published by the Israeli military and recognized in the U.N.
committee’s report have established the validity of some incidents that we
investigated in cases involving individual soldiers, they also indicate that civilians
were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy.” Id.
62 See Letter to the Leaders of Hamas, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 28, 2006),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/01/28/letter-leaders-hamas (urging the
leaders of Hamas to “announce publicly that [their] organization will not use
lethal force to target civilians or cause indiscriminate harm to civilians”).
63 See Occupied Palestinian Territories: Torn Apart by Factional Strife, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library
/asset/MDE21/020/2007/en/6609e419-d363-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6
/mde210202007en.html (culminating in 2007, “[b]oth Fatah and Hamas security
forces and armed groups committed grave human-rights abuses and displayed a
flagrant disregard for the safety of the civilian population”).
64 Haviv Rettig Gur, Law Professor: Hamas is a War Crimes ‘Case Study,’ THE
JERUSALEM
POST,
Jul.
11
2011,
http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages
/PrintArticle.aspx?id=129168 (quoting Professor Irwin Cotler) (emphasis added).
65 For excerpts from a 2007 interview with former Hamas foreign minister
Mahmoud A-Zahar, see The Hamas Terror War Against Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN
AFF.
(Mar.
2011)
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on
+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+2007.htm (“We are succeeding with the rockets.
We have no losses and the impact on the Israeli side is so much.”).
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trigger a right of self-defense in the sense of Article 51. Instead,
they emanated from an area over which ‘Israel exercises control.’66
This in turn served as a basis for distinguishing the Wall case from
the situation in Gaza where Israel possessed a more limited form of
control post-2005 disengagement. No Turkish adherence to this
fundamental fact has been made. This distinction between the
degree of control over the West Bank and the post-disengagement
Gaza Strip also underlies Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001)
and 1373 (2001), in which the Security Council needed to deal with
terrorist attacks emanating ‘from outside,’ i.e., from an area not
controlled by the victim state, such as Israel.
Fourthly, the International Court of Justice, in its
abovementioned 2004 Advisory Opinion, is inconsistent in itself.
In the backdrop of its rejection of Israel’s right to self-defense,
according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and per
Israel’s case for a separation fence bordering the West Bank (as in
paragraph 139), the Court also rather uneasily ruled otherwise.67
And so, in paragraph 141, the Court recognizes Israel’s twofold
self-defense related legal rights. The first is Israel’s right to act
against the hostilities initiated by Hamas against Israeli civilians.68
The second is Israel’s right and “indeed the duty” to take proactive
action and adequately respond: “The fact remains that Israel has to
face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its
civilian population. It has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in
order to protect the life of its citizens.”69 At no other point in the
Advisory Opinion does the Court take on mitigating jurisprudence
per this rather deep-seated inconsistency.
66 The 1995 Interim Oslo Accords leave Israel with security and civil control
over extended areas, in particular Areas B & C, of the West Bank, continuously at
the time of the ICJ Advisory Opinion decision. See Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, art. XIII(2), (7)–(8) Sept. 28, 1995,
36 I.L.M. 557. For the Court’s conclusion, see ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, at 194, para. 138.
67 To be sure, International Court held that the requirements of necessity
were not met. Israel has not argued for necessity per the Palmer Report, and
rightly so.
For necessity requirements, see Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83
(Jan. 28, 2002).
68 See ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, at 195, para. 141 (stating Israel’s right to
protect the lives of its citizens).
69 Id. (emphasis added).
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In addition, even in the backdrop of a harsh critique against
Israel’s choice of conduct per the Gaza Flotilla events, the UNHRC
Fact-Finding Report positively acknowledged that an armed
conflict exists between Israel and Hamas.70 The Mission did so
while considering that “the naval blockade was implemented in
support of the overall closure regime.”71 “As such it was part of a
single disproportionate measure of armed conflict” which the
commission found to be lopsided.72 Yet in so doing, it further
affirmed that the former holds a right of self-defense against the
latter.73 It then stated that “[t]he firing of rockets and other munitions
of war into Israeli territory from Gaza constitutes serious violations of
international law and of international humanitarian law.”74 The
UNHRC Report supposedly does affirm in this case referral to the
use of force doctrine comprehensively, incorporating jus ad bello
justifications, even in territories considered to be occupied, such as
the Gaza Strip. In continuation, recently, Chair of the Goldstone
Report, South African jurist Richard Goldstone, joined post-factum
the opinion that “Israel, like any other sovereign nation, has the right
and obligation to defend itself and its citizens against attacks from abroad
and within.”75 With that, UNHRC follows the present bend from
the use of force doctrine, thereby de facto admitting Israel’s right to
self-defense against Hamas in Gaza.
Fifthly, further reservation from the Turkish-led position is
challenged, per the use of force doctrine at large, with a 2008
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
key decision in the Boskoski and Tarculovski case. Referring to the
test established in the Tadic case, ICTY considered crimes
committed in connection with a conflict in Macedonia, between
70 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 14, para. 59 (stating
that the interception of the flotilla by Israel was a “measure of armed conflict” and
the attack “must be viewed in the context of the ongoing problems between the
Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority”).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See id. (suggesting that if the flotilla had posed a security threat to Israel
then Israel’s actions may have been proportionate).
74 Id. at 53, para. 263 (emphasis added).
75 Goldstone, supra note 61 (emphasis added). To be sure, Judge Goldstone
stated that crimes “committed by Hamas were intentional [and] goes without
saying—its rockets were purposefully and indiscriminately aimed at civilian
targets.” Id.
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government forces and the Albanian National Liberation Army
(NLA). In what should be said to support the Israeli Supreme
Court stance towards Hamas’ attacks on Israeli civilians, the Trial
Chamber clarified that terrorist acts, as any non-terrorist acts, may
constitute intense and “protracted [armed] violence” by the NLA,
that is “especially where they require the engagement of the armed forces
in hostilities.”76
The Tribunal initially observed whether “the engagement of
both parties in hostilities” was based upon acts that are
“perpetrated in isolation or as part of a protracted campaign.”77 It
then rendered the conflict an “internal [non-international] armed
conflict.”78 The case should serve as yet another important
milestone in the adoption of its underlying jurisprudence,
especially post 9/11.
2.3. The Triviality of the Intensity Threshold
The second critique to the Turkish and UNHRC Report’s
classification of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory, absent an
armed conflict, considers the intensity threshold for the mentioned
hostilities.79
The critique, in essence, differs from the
discontinuous and rather contextual abovementioned approach by
Human Rights organizations, such as Amnesty International,
which admitted the sustainability of an armed conflict solely for
particular and discontinuous hostilities. The intensity threshold, to
be sure, presides within armed conflicts jurisprudence alongside a
second one, namely the level of organization by the parties of non-

76 Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment,
para. 190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul 10, 2008) [hereinafter
Boskoski and Tarculovski Trial Judgment].
77 Id. para. 185.
78 Id. para. 292.
79 See Prosecutor v. Limaj & Bala, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (discussing how to
assess the “intensity of a conflict,” highlighting factors like the “seriousness of
attacks” and “whether there has been an increase in armed clashes”); Prosecutor
v. Haradinaj & Balaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49 (Int’l Crim Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (“These indicative [intensity] factors include
the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of
weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions
fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting . . . .”).
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international armed conflicts.80 Given the takeover of Hamas over
the Gaza Strip during 2007 and the establishment of a despotic
Hamas Government backed by its para-military wing (the Izz alDin al-Qassam Brigades) this criterion remains indisputable.
By interpretation of the intensity threshold, the ICTY Haradinaj
Trial Chambers stated a number of secondary considerations to be
considered ensemble, sufficient for the intensity criteria. They are
sub-classified threefold and serve in reply to the present critique
over the Turkish-led analytical disregard of the degree of this
conflict’s intensity. They are as follows: the first is the duration
and intensity of individual confrontations.81 The second is the type
of weapons used and the number of people involved and
affected.82 The third measurement of the intensity criteria is the
means of ending an armed conflict.83
To begin with, as for duration and intensity of individual
confrontations, the ICTY has already found it to satisfy “periodic
armed clashes” ranging from three to seven days, taking place over
“a widespread and expanding geographic area.”84 In the case of
the Israeli-Hamas hostilities, since the massive outbreak of
hostilities in October 2000, also known as the Al Aqsa Intifada,
until the beginning of the military operation against Hamas
80
The Haradinaj Trial Chamber additionally upheld that armed conflict
would exist solely between parties that are “sufficiently organized to confront
each other with military means.” Prosecutor v. Haradinaj & Balaj, Case No. IT-0484-T, Judgment, para. 60 (Int’l Crim Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
81 For intensity based on the ongoing conflict and not the immediate time of
events, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment, para.
566 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (analyzing the events
in Prijedor in the context of the larger conflict between “the Government of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb forces”) and Prosecutor
v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 186 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). For intensity based on the UNSC, see Tadic
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment, para. 567 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (describing the sanctions imposed on the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia by the United Nations) and Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 16, 1998) (construing “control” as the “material ability of a commander to
punish”).
82 For intensity based on the type of weapons used and arming efforts, see
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004).
83 Id. paras. 26–28.
84 Prosecutor v. Limaj & Bala, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 168 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
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codenamed “Operation Cast Lead,” which took place on December
2008, Hamas had launched rocket and mortar shell fire from the
Gaza Strip to Israel over 1,000 times.85 In 2007, Hamas accelerated
the military buildup of its para-military wing.86 Between June 2007
and June 2008, Hamas fired approximately three thousand times,
which. This also triggered an Israeli military operation against
Hamas codenamed “Operation Cast Lead,” which took place
between December 2008 and January 2009.87 Israel’s stated aim has
been to stop Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel.88 During
that time, the fighting was undoubtedly sufficiently intense
enough to amount to an armed conflict under IHL, with Hamas
firing 1,251 rockets and mortar shells at Israel for a period of
twenty-two days. 89 In its parliamentary report and elsewhere,
Turkey systematically has avoided mentioning these regrettable,
intense events and has remarkably avoided any analysis of Israel’s
rather trivial military necessity herein.
Secondly, intensity in an armed conflict is measured also by the
type of weapons used and the number of involved and affected
people. ICTY further exempts events that do not exceed the
capacity of traditional policing forces such as “violent
demonstrations, students throwing stones at the police, bandits
holding persons hostage for ransom, or the assassination of
government officials for political reasons”; ICTY did not define
85

See The Hamas terror war against Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas
+war+against+Israel/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+
2007.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (discussing the significant reduction in rocket
fire in the two years following Operation Cast Lead).
86 In an interview with former Hamas foreign minister Mahmoud A-Zahar
on August 21, 2007, he further clarified: “We are succeeding with the rockets. We
have no losses and the impact on the Israeli side is so much.” Id.
87 See, e.g., ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE “GAZA WAR”: A STRATEGIC
ANALYSIS, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 10 (Feb. 2, 2009) (draft),
available
at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf
(discussing the beginning of Operation Cast Lead following within days of a
major rocket attack by Hamas).
88 See id. at 38 (discussing the IDF’s several military, including the weakening
of Hamas and the reduction and end of the threat from rocket fire).
89 See The Operation in Gaza: Factual and Legal Aspects, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jul. 29, 2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation_in_GazaFactual_and_Legal_Aspects.htm (discussing legal issues arising out of The
Operation in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009).
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these forms of domestic violence as “armed conflicts.”90 The
armed forces in the paramilitary wing of Hamas fall into the ICTY
definitions.
In evaluating Israel’s armed conflict legal
justifications, remarkably neither a single leading human rights
NGO nor the Turkish Report took notice of the potency of Hamas’
paramilitary forces. Currently, these forces include more than
15,000 operatives,91 and are organized into semi-military
formations throughout the Gaza Strip.92 They are deployed in
territorial brigades and designated units. Each territorial brigade
has more than one thousand operatives divided into battalions.
Hamas’ weapons capabilities additionally include foreign
manufactured artillery rockets, anti-tank weapons, foreign
manufactured mines, anti-aircraft weapons, and night vision
equipment.93
Thirdly, the intensity threshold necessitates that a noninternational armed conflict starts with the instigation of hostilities
and ends only when a peace agreement is mutually agreed upon.94
90 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 154 (1997), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm;
see
also
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
30,
2005),
available
at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf (distinguishing
an armed conflict from banditry, insurrections, and terrorist activities, which are
not subject to international humanitarian law). Noticeably, the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court in article 8(2)(d) further supports this rule. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(d), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (excluding from the definition of war
crimes those crimes that are committed during “situations of internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a
similar nature”).
91 Marie Colvin, Hamas Wages Iran’s Proxy War on Israel, LONDON SUNDAY
TIMES, Mar. 9 2008.
92 See id. (discussing the extent to which Iran is believed to be behind Hamas
military operations, including their use of sophisticated weaponry).
93 See The Operation in Gaza, supra note 89, para. 80 (listing the significant
weapon and supply stockpiles amassed by Hamas after being smuggled through
Egypt into Gaza).
94 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, para. 128
(Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ENLjRKVm%2fDg%3d&tabid=104 (noting that a
state of armed conflict may continue after hostilities have ceased in an area);
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (citing the Tadic case and noting that
international humanitarian law applies until the general conclusion of peace is
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This is the case even in the backdrop of interim periods of little or
no intensity.95 In the Fofana (CDF) case, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone held that an armed conflict started in March 1991 and ended
in January 2002. 96The same Special Court in the Brima (AFRC)
case, however, held that during 1992 to 1993, there was an interim
period where no hostilities occurred between the Sierra Leonean
Army (SLA) and the Revolutionary Union Front (RUF).97
Similarly, with the present case of Hamas, no cease-fires ever
led to a peace agreement or even the cessation of hostilities;
Hamas’s violation of cease-fire agreement became its modus
operandi. For example, since the beginning of the cease-fire of
November 25, 2006, more than forty Kassam rockets have been
achieved in an international armed conflict or until a peace settlement is reached
in the case of internal armed conflict); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal, Case No. IT-02-54-T, para. 17 (citing Tadic for the
criteria for determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists: the
level organization of the parties and the intensity of the fighting); Prosecutor v.
Halilovic, Case No, IT-01-48-T, Judgment, paras. 24, 26, & footnote 72 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (same); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case
No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, paras. 101–02 (Dec. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CRutaganda%5Cjudgeme
nt%5C991206.pdf (citing Akayesu for the same test of armed conflict); see also,
Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, para. 18 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 13,
2004), available at http://www.transcrim.org/07%20SCSL%20-%202004%20%20Kallon%20Kamara (holding that the Lomé Agreement ended the armed
conflict).
95 See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, paras. 124–28 (focusing the
analysis on the level of organization of the parties rather than on the intensity of
the conflict); Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 183 (quoting Tadic for
the holding that IHL applies to the entire territory under control of the warring
parties, whether conflict occurs in particular areas); Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal para. 16–22 (focusing on a party’s
control over territory, rather than on the intensity of the conflict); Halilovic, Case
No, IT-01-48-T, Judgment, para. 26 (citing Tadic for the proposition that IHL
applies over the whole territory of an armed conflict whether conflict occurs
there).
96 See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, para
17 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone, May 28, 2008), available at http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9xsCbIVrMlY%3d&tabid=194 (discussing the
Trial Chamber judgment).
97 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Prosecution’s Pre-Trial
Brief Pursuant to Order for Filing Pre-Trial Briefs, para. 9 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra
Leone, Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-04-16PT-AFRC/SCSL-04-16-PT-029/SCSL-04-16-PT-029-I.pdf (finding that, instead of
fighting each other, the Sierra Leonean Army and the Revolutionary Union Front
had been looting and abusing citizens together).
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fired into Israel.98 Moreover, since the de facto cease-fire of
Operation Cast Lead, 337 rockets and 335 mortar shells have been
fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip by Hamas, with neither a
peace agreement nor a stable cease-fire between the parties in
sight.99
The criteria for intensity towards the Israeli-Hamas hostilities,
post-disengagement, ultimately were reviewed by the Israeli
Supreme Court in a meticulous 2006 judgment of a challenge to the
Israeli military’s “targeted killings.”100 The Court held that
between Israel and the various terrorist organizations, including
Hamas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there had been strikes
that “cause[d] harm and even death to innocent civilians.”101 That
is, there had been attacks and responses direct and constant
enough to constitute an armed conflict since the first Palestinian
uprising (the First Intifada).102 In continuation, the law applied by
the Court was that of international armed conflicts.103 This analysis
is widespread within legal academia,104 and was later reaffirmed
98 Behind the Headlines: Kassam Fire Goes on Despite Cease-fire, ISRAEL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA
/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/Behind+the+headlines++Kassam+fire+goes+on+despite+cease-fire+21-Dec-2006.htm.
99 See Palestinian Ceasefire Violations since the End of Operation Cast Lead, Israel
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA
/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Palestinian
_ceasefire_violations_since_end_Operation_Cast_Lead.htm (chronicling rockets
and mortar shells fired into Israeli territory).
100 See generally Targeted Killing case, supra note 48.
101 Id. para. 61.
102 The First Intifada (1987–1993) is known as the Palestinian uprising against
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. See generally INTIFADA: THE
PALESTINIAN UPRISING AGAINST ISRAELI OCCUPATION 5 (Zachary Lockman & Joel
Beinin eds., 1989).
103 See Targeted Killing case, supra note 48, paras. 11, 16 (“[A] continuous
situation of armed conflict has existed since the first infitada.”).
104 See, e.g., Yaël Ronen, ICC Jurisdiction Over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip,
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 3, 4 (2010) (chronicling numerous attacks killing many
Palestinians and some Israelis, and resultant claims of violations of laws of armed
conflict from both sides); Randle C. DeFalco, The Right to Food in Gaza: Israel’s
Obligation Under International Law, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 11, 17–22 (2009) (discussing
mandates and standards during times of international armed conflict); George E.
Bisharat, Israel’s Invasion of Gaza in International Law, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
41, 52–56 (2009) (discussing Israel’s desire to change the legal basis for its military
operations “from a law enforcement model to one of ‘armed conflict’”); Orna BenNaftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law’: A Legal
Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233, 271 (2003)
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by the Israeli Chief Military Advocate General in the backdrop of
the May 31, 2010 Freedom Flotilla to Gaza events.105
To conclude, in contrast to the stance adopted both by
Turkey106 and the UNHRC Fact Finding Report,107 the Supreme
Court of Israel and later the Turkel Commission Report initiated by
Israel were correct in adopting the position that (international)
humanitarian law applies to an armed conflict between Israel and
Hamas not merely in an area that is subject to occupation, but in
any case of an armed conflict of an international character.108
Certainly, The Israeli Supreme Court has implemented this
approach consistently in several judgments that addressed the
state of hostilities between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.109
Although Israel’s effective control over the borders of Gaza
appears well established, with both Israel and Egypt controlling
Gazan crossings respectively, the argument that Israel maintains
effective control throughout Gaza as a result of control of the
border is considerably weak. Israel’s control over Gaza is
(stating that the existence of an armed conflict is determined by the intensity of
hostilities).
105 See Testimony of The Chief Military Advocate General Avichai
Mandelblit, The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May
2010, The Turkel Commission, Session Number Four, 10 (Aug. 28, 2010) (detailing
the sources of legal advice given to the Israeli Navy).
106 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12 (describing an Israeli
attack on a humanitarian aid convoy to Gaza as using “excessive, indiscriminate
and disproportionate force . . . against the civilians on board”); Security Council
Speech, supra note 12 (expressing the Turkish position that the Israeli blockade of
Gaza was illegal collective punishment).
107 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 15 (restating the
conclusion of Human Rights Council Reports deeming the Israeli blockade of
Gaza unlawful).
108 See Targeted Killing case, supra note 48, para. 18 (stating that the question
remains whether the armed conflict is of an international or non-international
nature, notwithstanding the absence of international humanitarian law
throughout the Turkish led position).
109 See, e.g., HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister 1
IsrLR 1, 11–13 [2009], available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/09
/010/002/n07/09002010.n07.pdf (addressing the question of whether the conflict
between Israel and Hamas is an international armed conflict); Yuval Shany, The
Law Applicable to Non-occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bassiouni v. Prime Minister of
Israel, 42 ISR. L. REV. 101, 110 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s decision can be seen
as the outcome of balancing the human rights of residents of Gaza and Israel’s
national security); The Operation in Gaza, supra note 89 (discussing various issues
under international law arising out of Israel’s treatment of Gaza, and concluding
that Israel’s use of force was necessary and proportionate).
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especially weak because Hamas exerts considerable local, civil, and
military control over and within the entire Gaza Strip.
Furthermore, neither Gaza nor the Palestinian Authority has been
recognized as a sovereign state.110 It is therefore uncertain whether
they enjoy independence or sovereignty at large. As such, it is
theoretically possible that the conflict between Israel and Hamas is
instead a non-international armed conflict. In such a case, the only
international humanitarian law protections applicable are those
laid out in the second Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions (Protocol II), notwithstanding Israel’s reluctance to
ratify it.
2.4. The Laws of Armed Conflicts at Sea
The third critique to the classification of the Gaza Strip as
occupied territory by the Turkish and UNHRC Reports absent an
armed conflict considers the law of armed conflicts at sea. It bears
witness to two central observations that refer to national liberation
organizations or other paramilitary non-state actors.111
First, state practice shows that national liberation movements’
units or other non-state actors often conduct belligerent operations
at sea. Two examples of this are the Polisario Front attacking
Spanish trawlers fishing in the territorial waters off the Western
Sahara coast,112 and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
110 See, e.g., Daniel Benoliel & Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine and the ICC, 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 73, 101–08 (2010) (discussing possible arguments for the
establishment of a recognition of Gaza or Palestine as a sovereign state, but
explaining why the establishment of such states is inconsistent with a great deal of
international law); Ronen, supra note 104, at 19 (explaining various interpretations
of methods of establishing sovereignty, and stating that the limited jurisdiction
Palestinians have over the Gaza Strip has a “limited” effect on third parties).
111 Traditional rights connected with war at sea within international armed
conflicts referred to herein can be classified as hostilities between the constituted
government and the national liberation movement. That is, in opposition to
hostilities waged by the constituted government or the national liberation
movement against ships belonging to third States on the other, such as Turkey in
our case. The latter rather more legally constrained criteria remain outside the
scope of this Article, as explained at the outset. For more, see generally Natalino
Ronzitti, Introductory: The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed
Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A
COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 11–12 (N.
Ronzitti ed., 1988).
112 See id. at 11 (citing the Polisario Front as an example of a national
liberation movement being able to use the sea for “belligerent operations”).
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small naval units using small boats to approach Israeli beaches.113
The Israeli Turkel Committee was correct in offering an analogy
between the armed conflict at sea in the territorial waters of the
Gaza Strip and the Lebanese conflict in 2006, whereby the
“blockading Israeli warship INS Hanit was hit by a missile
launched by Hezbollah from the Lebanese coast.”114 The Israeli
Turkel Committee was also likely to be correct in affirming that in
light of the fact that the naval fleet of Hamas contains “mainly
small vessels that are capable of moving at high speeds, Israel’s
naval forces were confronted with a significant risk.”115 This risk is
demonstrated by the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 in Yemen,
and the attack on the French supertanker Limburg in 2002.116
The Israeli Military Advocate-General, in his testimony before
the Turkel Commission, fittingly has confirmed that Israel is bound
by international humanitarian law regardless of the classification
of the conflict as on land or at sea.
Secondly, the law of armed conflicts at sea serves as a critique
to the Turkish and the UNHRC Report’s classification on
additional grounds. The law of armed conflicts at sea noticeably
sustains lawful naval blockades in non-international armed
conflicts, such as the Israeli-Hamas blockade. Similar to the case of
the Israeli naval blockade over Hamas, states elsewhere have
imposed a military or economic blockade against an enemy that
was not considered a de jure government.117 Again, this practice
stretches worldwide, from the recognized naval blockade placed
by Union states on the Confederate states during the American
Civil War between the years 1861 and 1865, to the Bangladesh

113 See id. (explaining that Israel has destroyed boats carrying Palestinian
guerrillas and arrested ships suspected to have PLO members on board).
114 The Israeli Turkel Committee, supra note 13, at 53.
115 Id.
116 See id. (using the U.S.S. Cole and the Limburg as examples of “the threat
presented by small vessels and the difficulty in stopping them”).
The
applicability of these international armed conflicts examples to non-international
armed conflict remains outside the scope of this Article, which, as said, leaves
unresolved the question of whether the Israeli-Hamas armed conflict is
international or non-international in nature.
117 See e.g., C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 714–30
(6th ed. 1967) (chronicling the history of blockades and the related international
laws).
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Liberation War in 1971.118 The Turkish-led position regrettably
never considered state practices in its quest to make the case for the
alternative.
On that account, the Turkish position is even more
questionable because of Turkey’s statement that the San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea
relates specifically to legal practice in time of war, which
supposedly was not the case during the Israeli naval blockade over
Gaza.119 The San Remo Manual evidently does apply to the
blockade, however. The official Explanation that accompanies the
Manual states that even though its provisions were intended to
apply for the most part in situations of international armed
conflicts at sea, this fact was not stated expressly in order not to
deter the application of the manual’s provisions to noninternational armed conflicts, insofar as they involve naval
warfare.120 In other words, in contrast to the Turkish-led position,
the San Remo Manual could apply to both types of armed conflict.
Lastly, the imposition of the naval blockade on the Gaza Strip is
not unprecedented in the law of non-international armed conflict.
The naval blockade imposed by Israel on the Hezbollah
organization in Lebanon in March 2006 has been internationally
recognized as such, and is effective erga omnes.121
The third critique of the Turkish and UNHRC Report’s
classification of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory absent an
armed conflict argues that reservation towards the former view is
118 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Naval Blockade, 75 INT’L L. STUD. 203, 211
(2000) (describing several blockades throughout history, including the Indian
Navy’s blockade of the entire coast of Bangladesh).
119 See TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 60–62 (arguing
that the San Remo Manual is applicable to international armed conflicts at sea, but
not those of a non-international character).
120 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at
Sea: Explanation, INT’L INST. HUMANIT. LAW 73 (1995). As most of the rules that
appear in the San Remo Manual reflect customary international law, they are
binding on Israel. See Testimony of The Chief Military Advocate General, Avichai
Mandelblit, supra note 105, at 56 (“Most of the rules that appear in the San Remo
Manual, in my opinion, by my understanding they reflect customary international
law and therefore bind us.”).
121 See NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE
ACTORS 250–54 (2010) (discussing the legal issues behind the Isreali-Hezbollah
conflicts in 2006); ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, GEORGE SULLIVAN & WILLIAM D.
SULLIVAN, LESSONS OF THE 2006 ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR 131–35 (2007) (discussing
Israel’s use of naval forces against Hezbollah).
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further endorsed per territorial waters controlled by that state
(Israel in our case).122
To conclude this section, Turkey and the UNHRC Report have
almost flatly ignored the question of whether the situation in the
Gaza Strip is not only a situation of occupation, but also one of
active hostilities or armed conflict, either international or noninternational. This stance is especially weak on questions of
international humanitarian law (IHL). It is exceedingly important
to distinguish what each in point of fact thought on these
questions.123 Turkey and the UNHRC failed to explain why a
situation of armed conflict is absent even if the Gaza Strip post2005 is still considered occupied territory. Both neglected to
inquire whether the hostilities reached the level and intensity
required for the situation to be regarded as an armed conflict. If
this level was reached, Turkey and the UNHRC have failed to
provide evidence on which to base such an assessment. Moreover,
Turkey and the UNHRC seemingly failed to argue that even if
hostilities that reach the degree and level required to be regarded
as an armed conflict take place in occupied territories, the
occupying power remains restricted by the law of belligerent
occupation and may not resort to that part of the jus in bello that
applies to active hostilities.
3.

THE COLLAPSE INTO BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION DIALECTICS

But is the Turkish-led position concerning belligerent
occupation (absent armed conflict) in Gaza legally sustainable?
There seem to be two groups of arguments raised by critiques of
that question. The first applies substantive belligerent occupation
law to the situation in Gaza. This post-disengagement occupation
law dialectic is highly controversial. The second group of
122 Cf. Ronzitti, The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed
Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra
note 111, at 13–14 (discussing the impact that classifying waters as territorial or
neutral has on naval warfare). To be sure, IHL does not provide for national
liberation movements to enjoy belligerent rights on the high seas. Id.
123 See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 88–89 (2005) (“Rigorous
examination of the specific facts would seem to be indispensable in any inquiry
into compliance with norms of [of IHL], especially when carried out by a judicial
body.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

05 BENOLIEL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

644

11/30/2011 9:31 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

arguments flow from the Gaza Flotilla crisis of May 31, 2011. It
derives from belligerent occupation law’s numerous, particular
implications of the naval blockade, possibly making a stronger case
for the occupation of Gaza even since the 2005 disengagement.
3.1. Primary considerations
The first line of argumentation contends that belligerent
occupation law governs the situation in Gaza post-disengagement.
Yet this view, after the 2005 Israeli disengagement from the Gaza
Strip, is highly debatable.124
The present legal uncertainty over the matter is threefold. To
begin with, it is unclear to which degree effective control may or
may not necessarily entail actual military presence on the
ground.125 While “the source of the occupying power’s authority is
military superiority,” the ability to exercise authority rather than
actual physical presence supposedly determines when a territory is
occupied.126 While the Turkel Commission Report notably rejected
this argument,127 many disagree with the Commission, arguing
124 Compare Shany, supra note 109, at 104–07 (agreeing with the conclusion of
the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, that Gaza is not an
occupied territory), with David Luban, Was the Gaza Campaign Legal?, 31 A.B.A.
NAT’L SEC. L. REP. 2, 2–3 (2009) (noting that, despite its traditional backing of
Israel, the United States and the U.N. view Gaza as occupied territory). For the
view that Gaza is still subjected to Israeli belligerent occupation, see, e.g., Human
Rights Council Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 270–78; see also Sari Bashi & Kenneth
Mann, Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza, GISHA: LEGAL CENTER FOR
FREEDOM, 75–89 (2007) (providing a thorough analysis of the effective control test
for occupation, but ultimately concluding that Israel occupies Gaza); Mustafa
Mari, The Israeli Disengagement from the Gaza Strip: An End of the Occupation?, 8 Y.B.
INT’L HUM. L. 356, 366–68 (2005) (outlining Israel’s disengagement fro the Gaza
strip and concluding that the events in the area “leave no room for questioning
the status of Israel in the Gaza Strip: it remains the Occupying Power”).
125 See Shany, supra note 109, at 104 (noting that in the List case the
Nuremburg Tribunal held that Germany “occupied” territories that were outside
its actual control); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Israel’s Legal Obligations to Gaza after
the Pullout, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 524, 525 (2006) (“Boots on the ground are often a
reasonable proxy for authority over a territory, but nothing in the Hague
Convention makes them a prerequisite for a finding of occupation.”).
126 Bashi & Mann, supra note 124, at 76 (positing that it is not physical
presence but the ability to exert control that determines whether one government
actor occupies the territory of another).
127 The Israeli Turkel Committee, supra note 12, ¶ 47, at 53 (“[I]n alignment
with the Supreme Court of Israel, the Commission takes the position that Israel’s
effective control of the Gaza Strip ended when the disengagement was completed
in 2005.”).
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that Israel’s control over several particular areas aggregately affect
the fabric of life in the Gaza Strip and amount to ‘effective control’
of the Gaza Strip. The non-government organization Gisha: Legal
Center for Freedom of Movement, for example, argued before the
Turkel Commission that Israel effectively continues to control the
Gaza Strip for six reasons:
(i) Israel controls movement to and from the Gaza Strip via
land crossings; (ii) Israel exercises complete control over Gaza’s
airspace and territorial waters; (iii) Israel controls movement
within Gaza through periodic incursions and a ‘no-go zone’;
(iv) Israel controls the Palestinian population registry; (v) Israel
exercises control over Gaza’s tax system and fiscal policy; (vi)
Israel exercises control over the Palestinian Authority and its
ability to provide services to Gaza residents.128
This consideration, however, has not reached consensus legally or
within world public opinion.
Professor Yuval Shany, for example, points out a second
challenge to the occupation narration of Gaza since the 2005
disengagement—namely, that the existence of an organized, albeit
de facto, Palestinian government that exercises effective
governmental powers in the Strip without significant external
intervention is further evidence that belligerent occupation of Gaza
has ended.129 In startling contrast to the Israeli Supreme Court’s
decision in Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister—with which the Turkel
Commission agreed—human right organizations,130 the Turkish

Id. ¶ 45, at 51.
Shany, supra note 109, at 105 (explaining the reasons why Palestinian
presence in the Gaza Strip negates contentions that the Gaza Strip is occupied by
Israel); Shany, Binary Law, supra note 27, at 77 (suggesting that the situation in
Gaza is a borderline case because while Israel exerts some control over the Gaza
Strip, it “falls short of the level of control typically associated with occupiers
under the classic occupation paradigm,” since some degree of control is also
exercised by the Palestinian government).
130 See THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 51 n.154 (testimony of Ms.
Jessica Montel, member of the B’Tselem organization).
128
129

There is no doubt that Israel does not currently have effective control in
all aspects of life in the Gaza Strip, but it has such control in a few very
central areas, in the air space, the maritime space, the population
registry, the entry and exit of people and of cargo.
Id.
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government, the UNHRC Report,131 and the Goldstone Report132 all
centered their legal analyses on the applicability of belligerent
occupation law in Gaza since the disengagement, while
systematically
ignoring
Professor
Shany’s
proposition.
Regrettably, the Turkish-led position gave little or no analytical
attention to the objection to occupation dialectic, nor did the
Turkish-led position consider the applicability of armed conflicts
law particular to belligerent occupation law.133
There is a third legal uncertainty as to whether belligerent
occupation law should apply to Israel’s presumably effective
control in Gaza post-disengagement—the inaccurate legal trail in
the UNHRC’s Fact Finding Report. The Report seemingly refers in
its underlying paradigm to three factually unsettling United
Nations resolutions: Security Council Resolution 1860 (2009) and
General Assembly Resolutions 64/92 and 64/94.134 For a start, the
UNHRC Fact Finding Report refers to the Security Council
Resolution in relation to its position concerning the postdisengagement Israeli occupation of Gaza. The wording of the
Resolution, instead, merely stresses that the Gaza Strip was an
important part of the territory occupied in 1967 which is to become
part of a future Palestinian state. In other words, the drafters of the
Security Council Resolution carefully avoided what the UNHRC
Report does not, which is to consider Gaza as an occupied
131 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 62–64, at 15
(discussing whether Israel’s control of Gaza rises to the level of occupation under
international humanitarian law and deciding it does).
132 See The Goldstone Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 270–85 (devoting eleven
paragraphs in a section on international humanitarian law to the question of
whether the law of occupation applies to Israel’s control over the Gaza Strip,
while devoting only three paragraphs to whether the law of armed conflict
applies to conflict of an arguably non-international nature).
133 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 272 (stating that occupation continues
until a durable shift of control from the Occupying Power to the Sovereign people
takes place).
134 See Human Rights Council Report, supra note 17, at 15 n.52 (citing the
Security Council Resolution 1860 (2009), and General Assembly Resolutions 64/92
and 64/94, as repeated confirmation that Israel currently occupied the Gaza Strip).
For further background see G.A. Res. 64/92, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/92 (Jan.
19, 2010) (describing Israel as the “occupying power” in a Palestinian Territory);
G.A. Res. 64/94, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/94 (Jan. 19, 2010) (noting Israel’s
human rights violations in the “Occupied Palestinian Territory”); S.C. Res. 1860, ¶
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009) (calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops
from Gaza).
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territory. With Security Council Resolution 1860 being the sole
post-2005 disengagement resolution, it halfheartedly serves as
reference to the choice of law found within the UNHRC Report.
In addition, the UNHRC Report refers to General Assembly
Resolutions 64/92 and 64/94, which both avoid relating or
mentioning Gaza’s legal status post-2005 disengagement, but
rather broadly refer to a occupied Palestinian Territory, which
includes East Jerusalem. In sum, the United Nations resolutions
again serve a rather questionable reference to the classification by
Turkey and the UNHRC Report.
3.2. Supporting Considerations
The second group of arguments in support of belligerent
occupation status for Gaza since the disengagement grows out of
the Gaza Flotilla crisis of May 31, 2011. It derives belligerent
occupation implications from the naval blockade and its
enforcement in international waters. Five such arguments deserve
special attention, given their rather abbreviated yet oratory appeal
within the Turkish-led position on belligerent occupation and
Gaza. First, sanctions of the kind approved by the Israeli cabinet
being collective punishment are said to support the conclusion that
Gaza is belligerently occupied by Israel.
Second, Israel’s
imposition of a naval blockade per se supports the conclusion that
Israel is belligerently occupying Gaza. Third, Israel’s control of the
airspace over the Gaza Strip implicates its degree of effective
control, supporting the conclusion that Israel is a belligerent
occupier. Fourth, the alleged violation of human rights by Israel in
Gaza further supports the argument that Israel is a belligerent
occupier. Finally, humanitarian law obligations on Israel could be
perceived as post bellum obligations throughout a transition period
during which authority is transferred to a legitimate sovereign in
Gaza.
This second group of supportive arguments raises numerous
reservations. Firstly, the Turkish argument,135 in conjunction with

135 See Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, supra note 12, at 78–81
(arguing that the blockade, disguised as a security measure against Hamas, but
which really was a punitive measure against Gaza, is illegal under international
humanitarian law).
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the United Nations136 and humanitarian organizations,137
suggested that sanctions of the kind approved by the Israeli
cabinet—including the naval blockade of Gaza—constitute a form
of prohibited collective punishment within belligerent occupation
law.138 Hence these measures, broadly coined by Turkey as
‘sanctions,’ logically put in force the initial Turkish argument of
belligerent occupation of Gaza. Sanctions during occupation,
according to the Turkish line of reasoning, negate some of the
occupying power’s other obligations toward the protected
population, such as the duty to maintain public services or the
duty under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to provide an adequate standard of
living.139
136 See Louis Charbonneau, Collective Punishment for Gaza is Wrong -U.N.,
REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008
/01/18/idUSN18343083 (quoting the United Nations’ most senior humanitarian
official, Sir John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator: “[w]e all understand the security problems and
the need to respond to that but collective punishment of the people of Gaza is not,
we believe, the appropriate way to do that”).
137 See, e.g., Israel Cuts Electricity and Food Supplies to Gaza, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan.
21, 2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israel-cutselectricity-and-food-supplies-gaza-20080121 (calling for an immediate lifting of
the blockade in order to avert a public health emergency and deaths of the most
vulnerable—the sick, the elderly, women, and children).
138 See Geoffrey Aronson, Issues Arising from the Implementation of Israel’s
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip, 34 J. PALESTINE STUD. 49, 57 (2005) (highlighting
some of the rights and responsibilities Israel has as an occupying power through a
study of the Gaza Strip after disengagement and a recognized end the
occupation). Although the Turkish Report did not reference any specific
provisions of international humanitarian law, see Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (“Collective penalties and
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”).
139 See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 138, art. 56 (articulating
the duty to maintain “medical and hospital establishments and services, public
health and hygiene in the occupied territory”); id. art. 59 (articulating the duty of a
Occupying Power to facilitate relief schemes to ensure the provision of food,
medical supplies, and clothing); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 69, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 (articulating
an Occupying Power’s duty to ensure provision of clothing, bedding, shelter and
objects necessary for religious worship); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11–12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531
(articulating the duty to ensure the realization of the right to adequate standard of
living and of the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health); Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
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Yet this position is incomplete and also lacks the explanatory
power to explain the gap between the overall Turkish and Israeli
propositions in a broader sense. In response to the Turkish
position, therefore, even in the backdrop of the highly contentious
humanitarian implications of the Israeli sanctions, legally framing
the lex generalis alongside the lex specialis bodies of law still renders
much relevancy. In essence, the imposition of an Israeli policy that
resembles unilateral sanctions does not render per se the Gaza Strip
an occupied area. Israeli sanctions cannot be construed to establish
“effective control” within belligerent occupation law, as opposed
to the alternative missing categorization of these sanctions by
Turkey within the law of armed conflicts. Thus, sanctions could
have been said instead to have exercised Israel’s control over its
border with Gaza whereby goods and persons can still enter the
Strip from sovereign Egypt.140
Egypt indeed has pledged on numerous occasions to Israel not
to open the Gaza-Egyptian border controls until the European
border monitors return—something that would require Israeli
consent.141 Israel’s consent or lack thereof does not constitute per se
effective control under belligerent occupation jurisprudence, but
nevertheless is a rather serious concern for the law of armed
conflicts to assess. In particular, the Turkish Report has missed the
opportunity to pursue that analytical path altogether.
Moreover, Israel’s humanitarian policy towards Gaza most
likely cannot be understood as the imposition of bilateral sanctions
nor can it be justified under belligerent occupation law. This is the
case even in the backdrop of worldwide resentment over both the
Land, art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631 (1968) (articulating an occupant’s duty to
restore and ensure public order and safety while respecting the laws in force in
the country).
140 See Barak Ravid, Israel Agrees to Let UN Chief, EU Commissioner Enter Gaza,
HAARETZ (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-agrees-to-let-unchief-eu-commissioner-enter-gaza-1.264345 (informing that, in order to ease
international pressure in response to the blockade, Israel granted a unique request
from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and EU Foreign Policy Commissioner
Lady Catherine Ashton to enter Gaza in order to closely inspect humanitarian aid
work. It was the first time Israel acceded to a request from international officials
since December 2008).
141 See Egypt Will Keep Gaza Strip Border Closed: Israel, CTV NEWS, June 24,
2008, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/SciTech/20080624/Egypt_olmert_080624/
(reporting that Egypt had pledged “not to reopen its border crossing with the
Hamas-run Gaza Strip until a captive Israeli soldier was set free”).
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legal status of Gaza and the humanitarian implications of the
sanctions themselves. Bilateral sanctions require the involvement
of two sovereign states, which, in the case of the Hamas-led Gaza
Strip, is absent.142
If Gaza is neither occupied nor is a state, then a separate legal
framework governing economic sanctions between warring parties
within the law of armed conflicts applies.143 Turkey regrettably has
failed in following this setting. It should have found the law of
armed conflicts better suited in considering Israeli sanctions over
Gaza potentially illegal, at least in part. To illustrate, Article 33 to
the Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular, prohibits collective

142 For examples of states closing borders in the framework of bilateral
sanctions, consider the economic blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan,
as well as the economic blockade of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
by Greece. See generally Artak Dabaghyan & Mkhitar Gabrielyan, Keeping Border
Market Afloat: On Drivers and Constraints of Cross Border Cooperation in the South
Caucasus, CAUCUS RES. RESOURCE CENTERS, http://www.crrc.am/store/files
/Article_on_border_market.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (discussing the
economic and cultural impact of border closings); Azerbaijani MP Offers Iran to
Close Borders with Armenia, NEWS.AZ (Feb. 12, 2010), http://news.az/articles/8967
(reporting on the suggestion by deputy Zahid Oruj that Iran close its Armenian
border in order to facilitate settlement of the Karabakh conflict). See also Deputy
Foreign Minister: Closed Borders in 21st Century Are Unnatural, PANORAMA.AM (Mar.
30,
2009),
http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2009/03/30/agn/?sw
(reporting statements made by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia Karine
Ghazinyan that states should retain open borders while attempting to resolve
conflict); Macedonia Embargo is Halted by Greece, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/world/macedonia-embargo-is-haltedby-greece.html (describing Greece’s nineteen month embargo of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as “crippling” and harmful to both the Greek
and Macedonian economies).
143 But see Amichai Cohen, Economic Sanctions in IHL: Suggested Principles, 42
ISR L. REV. 117, 117 (2009) (accepting that while international humanitarian law
applies to armed conflicts, other conditions regarding economic sanctions should
be adopted so as to limit their harmful effects on civilians). For the theory of
sanctions in international law, see Eiichi Fukatsu, Coercion and the Theory of
Sanctions in International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 1187, 1188 (Ronald St.J.
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983) (contending that international law
is enforced by the reaction and interaction of states in the form of sanctions); see
also Todd A. Wynkoop, The Use of Force Against Third Party Neutrals to Enforce
Economic Sanctions Against a Belligerent, 42 NAVAL L. REV. 91, 98 (1995) (suggesting
a framework analogous to Justice Jackson’s Youngstown v. Sawyer framework for
analyzing the scope of executive power depending on the behavior of Congress
for analyzing the legality of a state’s resort to sanctions depending on Security
Council behavior).
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punishment of protected persons.144 “Protected persons” are
civilian individuals who, in a situation of an occupation or armed
conflict, find themselves in the hands of a power of which they are
not nationals, such as in the case of Israel.145 More specifically, the
term “protected persons” has also been applied to refugees and
stateless persons in cases of armed conflict without belligerent
occupation, as possibly is the case of Palestinian Gazans.146
To conclude, Turkey has erred, and regrettably so, in
laconically depicting Israel as an occupying power thereby
criticizing Israel for collectively punishing its “protected persons.”
Fair legal variance over the question of Gaza as belligerently
occupied leaves the logic of collective punishment mistakenly
dependent on the occupation hypothesis. Turkey should have
proposed a second accumulative or independent analytical
approach: if no belligerent occupation of Gaza exists, Turkey
should have analyzed Israel’s activity in Gaza under the law of
armed conflicts. It would have been able to cautiously assess
Israel’s de facto siege warfare policies over Gaza possibly in
aggregation of its various ramifications at land, air and lately also
at sea.
Secondly, Turkey additionally argued that Israel’s imposition
of a naval blockade, independently of its legality per se, further
supports the legal narrative under which Israel is belligerently
occupying Gaza.147 The Turkel Commission rightly replied to the
latter argument that, similar to the air space blockade argument,
the imposition of a naval blockade does not put into effect
belligerent occupation law.148
Notwithstanding the broader
debatable question of effective control over Gaza, such control
would have meant also the power to maintain law and order over
the shores of Gaza independently.149 Israeli forces in such
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 138.
3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1145 (Peter MacAlisterSmith ed., 1992).
146 Id. at 1146.
147 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 78 (making the point
that the blockade was in fact retaliation for the election of Hamas).
148 ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, ¶ 46, at 52.
149 Id. (“It should be emphasized that the very lack of ‘control’ over the land
territory in the Gaza Strip in the traditional sense of this term is what makes an
external naval blockade necessary to control access to and egress from that
territory.”)
144
145
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hypothetical reality would be able to intercept vessels from the
coast of the Gaza Strip. In practice, however, Israel postdisengagement never kept control over the coast of the Gaza
Strip.150 The Hamas security apparatus, including naval forces,
effectively controls this area.151
Thirdly, Turkey claims that Israel’s control of the airspace of
the Gaza Strip is evidence that Israel is belligerently occupying
Gaza even since the disengagement.152 In response, as correctly
argued by the Turkel Commission, there is no support in
international law for the proposition that the control of airspace
amounts to ‘effective control’ and does not lead ipso facto to the
designation of an area as “occupied.”153 As Professors Avi Bell and
Dov Shefi further clarify, there simply is no definitive example in
international law for air space control that has amounted to
“effective control” within belligerent occupation law.154 On the
contrary, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
Bankovic v. Belgium and Others held that NATO’s control over the
Yugoslavian airspace of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during

Id.
Id.
152 TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 82 (offering examples
of Israel’s continued control of the Gaza Strip’s borders, airspace, and territorial
seas). Cf., Carey James, Mere Words: The “Enemy Entity” Designation of the Gaza
Strip, 32 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 643, 654–55 (2009) (explaining that the
Disengagement Plan grants Israel exclusive authority over Gaza airspace, which
includes the ability to conduct air strikes from Gaza airspace and control civil
aviation within Gaza); The Israel “Disengagement” Plan: Gaza Still Occupied,
PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORG. NEGOTIATION AFF. DEP’T (Sep. 2005),
http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=85 (detailing Israel’s disengagement
plan, under which Israel would retain control over Gaza airspace); Saeb Erekat,
Gaza
Remains
Occupied,
BITTERLEMONS.ORG
(Aug.
22,
2005),
http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl220805ed30.html#pal2 (arguing that
the Israeli disengagement plan will not release Israel from the status of occupier in
Gaza); Palestinian FM: Pull Out Will Not End Gaza Occupation, THE DAILY STAR,
Aug.
9,
2005,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/Aug/09
/Palestinian-FM-Pullout-will-not-end-Gaza-occupation.ashx#axzz1cWIcO6Bm
(conveying the sentiments of the Palestinian foreign minister that, without the
ability to exercise full sovereignty, Palestine would remain occupied by Israel
even after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip).
153 ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 52 (citing Bankovic v. Belgium,
discussed infra note 158).
154 See Avi Bell & Dov Shefi, The Mythical Post-2005 Israeli Occupation of the
Gaza Strip, 16 ISR. AFF. 268, 281 (2010) (arguing that effective control requires
control of the land of the territory, not just airspace, water or external borders).
150
151
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the 1999 bombing campaign was in fact not a basis for arguing
“effective control” within belligerent occupation law.155 Rather
than conceding the lack of evidence and refraining from making a
finding on the basis of no previous case law or invoking case in
law on point, Turkey bases its claims on the inflammatory rhetoric
that Israel should presumably have been “more aware than most of
the importance of humanitarian assistance” and that Israel should
have been aware of the “dangers and inhumanity of ghettos” such
as with the supposedly occupied Gaza.156
Fourthly, Turkey argues that Israel’s years-long “inhumane
Israeli blockade” impinges human rights and supports the
conclusion that Israel is a belligerent aggressor in Gaza.157 In
contrast, the ECHR in Bankovic avoided any extraterritorial
application of the European Convention of Human Rights.158 The
Court firmly rejected the petitioners’ argument that NATO
member states had violated their rights by bombing a television
station.159
Similarly, under existing belligerent occupation
jurisprudence, Israeli control of crossings into the Gaza Strip—
including closing the strip off at will—does not suggest ipso facto
that Gaza is occupied.

155 Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335. The precise implication of
this holding within the IHL framework remains outside the scope of this article.
156
Security Council Speech, supra note 12. Additionally, Turkey’s Prime
Minister declared:

To those who stand behind this inhuman, this inhuman and illegal
operation;
As much as you stand behind illegality, we stand behind laws.
As much as you stand behind the bloody operation, aggressivenes[s],
behind terror, as much do we stand behind justice.
As much as you stand against civilians, against the oppressed in Gaza,
Palestine as much stand we next to, behind civilians, innocent people, the
Palestinian people, the people in Gaza.
Turkish Prime Minister’s Speech, supra note 11.
157 Security Council Speech, supra note 12.
158 See Bankovic, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., at 356–59 (holding that “it is not
satisfied that the applicants . . . were capable of coming within the jurisdiction of
the respondent States on account of the extraterritorial act in question”).
159 Id. at 358–59 (rejecting the petitioners’ argument that “failure to accept . . .
jurisdiction . . . would defeat the ordre public mission of the Convention and leave
a regrettable vacuum in the Convention system of human rights’ protection”).
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Fifthly, scholars have argued that parties should remain
obligated to international humanitarian law during the postbellum
transition period, a principle which they would presumably apply
to Israel while it transfers authority to the legitimate sovereign,
presumably the Hamas government.160 Application of this legal
framework to the case of post-disengagement Gaza, however,
overlooks certain complications.161 First, postbellum obligations
usually apply to transformative occupations162 and Gaza postdisengagement is not such an occupation.163 In a transformative
occupation, an occupying power’s postbellum obligations are
intended to foster “’public order and civil life’ during and
immediately after the termination of the occupation and the
transition to indigenous rule.”164 Yet, this was never Israel’s formal
intent, especially after Hamas’s brutal takeover of the previously
Fatah-led Gaza in 2007, in contrast with Israel’s competing policy
in the Fatah-led West Bank. Regrettably, nor was it Hamas’s intent
before or after it took power over Gaza. For example, in a futile
attempt to provide economic assistance to Gaza’s agriculture-based
economy, Israel left greenhouses intact after withdrawal, but
Palestinian looters subsequently looted and damaged them as
160 See Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of
Operation Iraqi “Freedom”, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2347–48 (2007) (concluding that a
jus post bellum legal regime should account for human rights during postoccupation transitions); Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War
Tradition: Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116, 162–63 (2005) (concluding
that the just war principle should extend to postwar activity and be “morally
consistent with the initial reasons for going to war”). See generally Mark J. Allman
& Tobias L. Winright, Jus Post Bellum: Extending the Just War Theory, in 53 FAITH IN
PUBLIC LIFE 241 (2007) (arguing that the just cause principle should guide jus post
bellum ethics and extend warring parties’ ethical obligations to postwar
reconstruction).
161 See, e.g., Shany, supra note 27, at 16–17 (explaining that “the validity of the
Oslo Accords, and, in particular, of its defunct sovereignty-limiting provisions, is
very much in doubt”).
162 See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of
War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 619 (2006) (suggesting that jus post
bellum may provide “a better basis for handling [transformative occupation]”).
163 Id. at 592 (noting that scholarship on Israeli-occupied territories focused
upon Israel’s occupation as ordinary belligerent occupation rather than
transformative occupation).
164 Eyal Benvenisti, The Law on the Unilateral Termination of Occupation pt. C, I
(Tel Aviv Univ. Law Sch., Faculty Working Paper No. 93, 2008), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099&context=taulwps
(citing Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention).
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“police stood by helplessly.”165 An occupant owes an affirmative
duty both (1) to respect as much sovereignty of an occupied
population as possible, and (2) to seek their consent in any project
for reconstruction—assuming consent is achievable.166 Professor
Dinstein’s argument is, therefore, regrettably immaterial because it
does not account for such change of eventualities postdisengagement.
The duty to respect the sovereignty of a defeated nation167
provides an additional impediment to maintaining postbellum
obligations in Gaza after disengagement. Individuals typically
regard this separate duty as a gradual process of attaining
independence. With Gaza, Israel has strongly opposed any
declaration recognizing Hamas as the de facto government or even
recognizing some degree of de facto Palestinian-Gaza
independence. Similarly, the Oslo Interim Accords between Israel
and the Palestinian Authority do not agree on such deviation. This
also occurred on at least two other occasions prior to
disengagement. First, as the Palestinians stressed throughout the
Oslo Interim Agreement negotiations, the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank constituted one territorial unit. Consequently, Israel has
implied that any withdrawal from only one of the two territories
could not affect the overall unit’s legal status per se; therefore, such
a withdrawal, Israel reasons, would not grant unilateral Palestinian
sovereignty over the Palestinian territory or parts.168 That is, Israel
posits that the status of the unit would not be changed by any
Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian population centers, including

165 See Looters Strip Gaza Greenhouses, MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2005, 10:25:07 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9331863/ns/world_newsmideast_n_africa/t/looters-strip-gaza-greenhouses/ (detailing the extensive
looting of Gaza greenhouses and stating that “roughly 30 percent of the
greenhouses suffered various degrees of damage”).
166 Gary Bass has opined that the jus post bellum criteria should include: the
conduct of war crimes trials, compensatory reparation, and the duty to respect the
sovereignty of the defeated nation and to seek their consent in any project for
reconstruction. See generally Gary J. Bass, Jus Post Bellum, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 384
(2004) (outlining Bass’s perceived core criteria to jus post bellum).
167 See Bass, supra note 166, at 392 (“The duty to respect to the greatest extent
possible the sovereignty of the defeated nation . . . is . . . both an obligation of
justice and a counsel of political prudence.”).
168 PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORG. NEGOTIATION AFF. DEP’T, supra note 152
(discussing Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip).
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the Gaza Strip.169 Secondly, Israel and the Palestinians specifically
agreed bilaterally in the Oslo Accords that the territorial waters off
Gaza would be included in the territorial jurisdiction of the
Palestinian Authority.170 In the agreement, however, Israel and the
Palestinian Authority wholly excluded the external security of the
Gaza Strip from the Palestinian Authority’s functional jurisdiction,
which remains an Israeli obligation until a final status
agreement.171
To conclude, the second group of arguments which followed
on the Gaza Flotilla crisis lead to additional legal obscurity with
the Turkish-led narration of belligerently occupied Gaza absent an
armed conflict situation. Turkey’s reasoning is highly debatable on
four separate grounds. First, the sanctions approved by Israel
along with the imposition of a naval and airspace blockade,
support the conclusion that Israel is a belligerent occupier in
effective control of the Gaza Strip. Second, the alleged violation of
human rights by Israel in Gaza supports the conclusion that Israel
is a belligerent occupier. Third, the argument that Israel’s
obligations under IHL are postbellum obligations—e.g., a
transition period where authority is transferred to a legitimate
sovereign in Gaza—is factually and legally unsound. Fourth,
Turkey’s stance that the post-2005 Gaza Strip is still an occupied
territory notwithstanding the possibility that an armed conflict
exists is self-contradictory.

169 Id. (stating that “the Accords expressly reiterated that the Gaza Strip and
West Bank will continue to be considered one territorial unit, and that withdrawal
from Palestinian population centers will do nothing ‘to change the status’ of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip for the duration of the Accords”).
170 See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Isr.-Palestine, art. 5,
¶ 1(a), May 4, 1994, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process
/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+Area.h
tm (agreeing that the territorial jurisdiction, which includes territorial waters,
“covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area territory as defined in Article I, except
for Settlements and the Military Installation Area”).
171 Id. art. 5, ¶¶ 1(b) & (3) (reserving sole authority over “external security”
with Israel). Furthermore, Article VIII of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement specifically
states that “Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility . . . for defense against
external threats from the sea and from the air . . . and will have all the powers to
take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.” Id. art. VIII, ¶ 1.
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OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS

Turkey’s third central claim raised in its U.N. report argues
that alleged human rights violations perpetrated by Israel in
Gaza—in the form of a supposed “inhumane Israeli blockade” of
multiple years—supports the idea that Israel is belligerently
occupying Gaza.172 In response to Turkey’s allegations, Israel
issued the Turkel Commission Report, which explained that Israel
does not fall under the law of belligerent occupation because it
lacks the ability to enforce order and manage civilian life in the
Gaza Strip.173 Interestingly, the Turkel Report employed rather
moderate language. In comparison, the aforementioned Israeli
Supreme Court opinion of Al-Bassiouni v. Prime Minister had
previously employed firmer language in holding that Israel had
not exercised “effective control” in Gaza. Indeed, the Turkel
Report merely reasoned that if Israel actually possessed effective
control over the Gaza Strip, then it would have had sufficient
authority to maintain order to protect human rights from within
Gaza’s shore itself.174 Be that as it may, Israel has rejected the
application of Turkey’s controversial approach often semantically
described as “‘human rights law of non[-]international armed
conflict.’”175
And so, the Turkish-led position suggests that international
human rights law should be mandatorily invoked in the non172 See, e.g., Security Council Speech, supra note 12 (chastising Israel’s
purported blockade of ships which were described as providing humanitarian aid
to Gaza).
173 Id.
174 The report argued:

If Israel did indeed have effective control over the Gaza Strip, then it
would have the power to act as the authority responsible for maintaining
order in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli forces would then be able to wait on
the coast of the Gaza Strip and intercept the vessels there. In practice,
however, Israel does not control the coast of the Gaza Strip. This area is
under the ‘effective control’ of Hamas.
THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 52.
175 Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-Envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed
Conflict, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219, 235 (2011). See also generally Francisco Forrest
Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force
Rule in the Law of Armed Conflicts, 64 SASK. L. REV. 347 (2001) (discussing and
advocating for the use of human rights law in certain components of the law of
armed conflict).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

05 BENOLIEL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

658

11/30/2011 9:31 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

international armed conflict between Israel and Hamas rather than
merely looking toward international humanitarian law as a
The “human rights law of nonpersuasive authority.176
international armed conflict” is primarily a construct of scholars
that has gained heightened support primarily through recent
scholarship.177 Nonetheless, proponents of Turkey’s position on
the Gaza blockade have also gradually adopted this scholarly
construct.178
Controversial judgments of the ECHR in Isayeva and Isayeva,
Yusupova and Bazayeva lay in this approach’s backdrop.179 The
predominant approach adopted by the ECHR was indeed to apply
human rights law directly to non-international armed conflict, an
approach that certain academics have subsequently embraced.180
And yet, as Professor Sivakumaran cautions, “it remains
unclear whether the ECHR considered the situation in question to
be an internal armed conflict or, rather, a state of internal tensions
and disturbances.”181 Additionally, it is not fully certain whether
the Court applied international humanitarian law or human rights
law at large.182
176 See, e.g., TURKISH NAT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 12, at 78–81
(invoking human rights principles in characterizing the blockade as a “collective
punishment” against the entire Gaza population which is “prohibited under
international law”). This position was also adopted in the UNHRC Report “in
view of the conduct of the IDF on board the Mavi Marmara as well as the conduct
of the authorities in the aftermath of the operation.” Human Rights Council
Report, supra note 17, at 16–18.
177 See sources cited supra note 175 (citing to scholarship advocating for the
approach of human rights law of non-international armed conflict).
178 For an extraterritorial application of human rights law within the Gaza
context even without an armed conflict or belligerent occupation, see, e.g.,
DeFalco, supra note 104, at 17–22.
179 App. Nos 57947/00, 57948/00, and 57949/00, Isayeva, Yusupova and
Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 24 Feb. 2005; App. No. 57950/00, Isayeva v.
Russia, (Judgment of 24 Feb. 2005).
180 See, e.g., Gaggioli and Kolb, ‘A Right to Life in Armed Conflicts? The
Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights’, 37 ISRAEL YRBK HUMAN RIGHTS
115, 115 (2007) (stating that human rights law is most applicable).
181 Sivakumaran, supra note 175, at 235.
182 Professor Sivakumaran refers to multiple contradictory indications
relevant to this uncertainty in the judgment. On one hand, the ECHR invoked
international humanitarian law terms such as “‘legitimate military targets’,
‘disproportionality in the weapons used’, and ‘illegal armed insurgency’”.
Sivakumaran, supra note 175, at 235. On the other hand, it “also referred to ‘lawenforcement’ and being ‘outside wartime.’” Id.
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Turkey’s choice of laws is therefore indeed consistent with this
frail approach of “human rights law of non-international armed
conflict.” In terms of compliance, Turkey’s preferred approach
might be interpreted to assume implicitly its underlying
jurisprudential propositions because few rules exist under
international humanitarian law for regulating non-international
armed conflict.183 Moreover, international humanitarian law
suffers from a lack of specificity and is therefore impractical in the
case of the Israeli-Hamas armed conflict.184
Turkey’s position outlined in this Article possesses multiple
shortcomings. As to human rights norms, the lex specialis
relationship between human rights law and international
humanitarian provisions185 supports the assumption that human

183 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (asserting that whether
international or non-international armed conflict norms should apply to the
blockade remains open to debate); William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of
Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 741, 746–50 (2005) (observing the ECHR’s perceived application of
humanitarian law doctrines to internal conflicts but arguing that doing so is
difficult due to a current lack of existing humanitarian law standards for internal
conflicts); Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed
Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 737, 746 (2005) (noting that the “IHL treaty law
dealing with non-international armed conflicts is . . . sparse”).
184 See Abresch, supra note 183, at 746–47 (“The rationale that makes resort to
humanitarian law as lex specialis appealing—that its rules have greater
specificity—is missing in internal armed conflicts . . . . [T]he humanitarian law of
internal armed conflicts is quite spare and seldom specific . . . .”); Heike Krieger, A
Conflict of Norms: The Relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law
in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 265, 274 (2006)
(noting that the conventions governing internal conflicts lack specificity and
concluding that humanitarian law is not necessarily “more appropriate for the
regulation of internal armed conflicts”).
185 The classical source of this lex specialis relationship derives from a
pronouncement of the International Court of Justice:

In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies
also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then fails to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to
regulate the conduct of hostilities.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 240 (July 8). See also ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 43, ¶ 106 (“In order to answer the
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these
branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis,
international humanitarian law.”).
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rights would only be applied under the laws governing armed
conflict. However, even if human rights standards were applied
separately,186 the United Nations Human Rights Committee has
declared that they would apply in cases where subjects are under a
state’s jurisdictional control per Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.187 The United Nations
Human Right Committee has deemed belligerent occupation as
“effective control” under Article 2.188 However, it is debatable as to
whether Israel is a belligerent occupier in Gaza. Hence, whether
Gaza’s citizens may simultaneously invoke international
186 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 82 (discussing examples of
“[d]ivergence between the law of human rights and the law of belligerent
occupation”); Roberts, supra note 162, at 594 (“The relation between human rights
law and the laws of war is not just a simple confrontation between the lex generalis
of human rights and the lex specialis of the laws of war.”); Watkin, supra note 49, at
1–2, 26–28 (discussing the application of humanitarian law to internal conflict and
the difficulty of reconciling the two existing legal systems in doing so); see also
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency
(article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (discussing the
role in protecting human rights of Article 4 of the covenant). For an example of an
International Court of Justice opinion referring to the separate applicability of
human rights law, see ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of
the Construction of the Wall, supra note 43, at 178. But see, Michael J. Dennis,
Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and
Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119 (2005) (offering a critique of the
approach adopted in the ICJ Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences
of the Construction of the Wall).
187 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May
26, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment No. 31]
(“State Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction”); INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 452 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2d ed.
2006) (noting that Article 2 of the ICCPR requires that “a state must respect and
ensure the rights of all individuals ‘within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction’”).
188 The Human Rights Committee has declared that states must ensure the
protection of:

Covenant [rights] to anyone within the power or effective control of that
State Party . . . . This principle applies to those within the power or
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory,
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control
was obtained.
U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment No. 31, supra note 187, ¶ 10.
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humanitarian law provisions remains questionable. In other
words, assuming human rights obligations can extend
extraterritorially, the determination of whether human rights were
actually violated during the post-disengagement Gaza blockade
may be vulnerable to supersession by armed conflict law.
On the other hand, Israel’s Turkel Report asserts that the two
normative regimes—namely, (1) armed conflicts law and (2)
international human rights—“share a ‘common core’ of
fundamental standards which are applicable at all times, in all
circumstances, to all parties, and from which no derogation is
permitted.”189 The report further reasons that, “[s]ince the right of
the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip to life is addressed in the lex
specialis that applies [to the blockade], namely the rules of
international humanitarian law, it is these rules that should be
By missing on this third cardinal observation
applied.”190
concerning human rights law, Turkey, and those that share its
view, have lost a fine opportunity to address Israel’s own approach
of combining the laws of armed conflicts with “core” human rights
law. Taking Israel’s approach into account could have facilitated a
useful reevaluation of whether Israel did or did not violate laws
when it instituted the blockade (or possibly siege) by land, air, sea,
or combination thereof.
5.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the positions set forth by Turkey and the UNHRC
Fact Finding Report, Israel’s Supreme Court and its subsequent
Turkel Commission Report were correct to assert that international
humanitarian law applies to an armed conflict between Israel and
Hamas, notwithstanding the applicability of belligerent occupation
law in Gaza since the 2005 disengagement.
Hence, Turkey, numerous other national governments
(especially Arab ones), leading human rights NGOs, and United
Nations Organs such as the UNHRC oddly tend to ignore Israel’s
application of IHL. As discussed in this Article, these groups also
implicitly disregard Israel’s right to apply the self-defense doctrine
of Article 51 in the United Nations Charter.
189
190

THE ISRAELI TURKEL COMM., supra note 13, at 103.
Id.
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What is more, their analysis of whether hostilities reached the
requisite level of intensity required for the blockade to be deemed
an armed conflict falls short. Additionally, their assessment fails to
provide sound evidence. Moreover, even if hostilities rose to the
degree and level required to be classified as an armed conflict in an
occupied territory, the occupying power would remain restricted
to its powers under the law of belligerent occupation.
Consequently, Israel would not necessarily have to comply with
the component of jus in bello that applies to active hostilities.
It is ironic that this overall assertion effectively safeguards
Israel against potentially meaningful critique over its debatable
siege policies in Gaza. Regrettably, Turkey’s loss of a fine
opportunity to avoid this consequence through its report of the
events to the United Nations is also the loss of the rule of
international law. Yet, ultimately it is Israel’s loss—as well as the
loss of its Palestinian counterparts—toward the effort for peace
and justice.
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